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The concept of a perfect equilibrium point has been intro-
duced in order to exclude the possibility that disequili-
brium behavior is prescribed on unreached subgames.
(Selten 1965 and 1973). Unfortunately this definition
of perfectness does not remove all difficulties which may
arise with respect to unreached parts of the game. It is
necessary to reexamine the problem of defining a satisfac-
tory non-cooperative equilibrium concept for games in ex-
tensive form. Therefore a new concept of a perfect equili-
brium point will be introduced in this paper.1)
In retrospect the earlier use of the word "perfect" was
premature. Therefore a perfect equilibrium point in the old
Sense will be called "subgame perfect". The new definition
of perfectness has the property that a perfect equilibrium
point is always subgameperfect but a subgameperfect equi-
librium point may not be perfect.
It will be shown that every finite extensive gamewith per-
fect recall has at least one perfect equilibrium point.
Since subgameperfectness cannot be detected in the normal
form, it is clear that for the purpose of the investiga-
tion of the problem of perfectness, the normal form is
an inadequate representation of the extensive form. It will
be convenient to introduce an "agent normal form" as a more
adequate representation of games with perfect recall.
1) The idea to base the definition of a perfect equilibrium
point on a model of slight mistakes as described in sec-
tion 6 is due to John C. Harsany1. The author's earl1er
unpublished attempts at a formalization of thi~ concept
were less satisfactory. I am very grateful to John C. Harsanyi
who strongly influenced the content of this paper.
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1. Extensive games with perfect recall
In this paper the words extensive qamewill always refer
to a finite game in extensive form. Agame of this kind can
be described as a sextuple.
(1) r =(K,P,U,C,p,h)
where the constituents K,P,U,A,p and h of rare as follows:2)
The game tree: The game tree K is a finite tree with a dis-
tinguished vertex 0, the origin of K. The sequence of ver-
tices and edges which connects 0 with a vertex x is call-
ed the path to x. We say that x comes before y or that y
comes after x if x is different from y and the path to y
contains the path to x. An endpoint is a vertex z with the
property that no vertex comes after z. The set of all end-
points is denoted by Z. A path to an endpoint is called a
play. The edges are also called alternatives. An alternative
at x is an edge which connects x with a vertex after x.
The set of all vertices of K which are not endpoints, is
denoted by X.
The player partition: The player partition P = (Po,...,Pn)
partitions X into player ~. Pi is called player i's player
set (Player 0 is the "random" player who represents the ran-
dom mechanisms responsible for the random decisions in the
game.) A player set may be empty. The player sets Pi with
i = 1,...,n are called personal player sets.
The information partition: For i = 1,...,n a subset u of Pi
is called eligible (as an information set) if n is not empty,
if every play intersects u at most once and if the number
of alternatives at x is the same for every XEU. A subset UEPO
is called elegible if it contains exactly one vertex.The infor-
mation partition U is a refinement of the player partition P
tnto eligible subsets u of the player sets. These sets u are
called information ~.The information sets u with u~Pi are
called information sets of playe~ i. The set of all information
2) The notation is different from that used by Kuhn (Kuhn 1953)
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sets of player i is denoted by Ui. The information sets of
player 1,...,n are called personal information sets.
The choice partition: For UtU let Au be the set of all alter-
natives at vertices XEU. We say that a subset c of Au is
eliqible (as a choice) if it contains exactly one alterna-
tive at x for every vertex XEU. The choice partition C par-
titions the set of all edges of K into eligible subsets c
of the Au with UtU. These sets c are called choices. The
choices c which are subsets of Au are called choices ~ u.
The set of all choices at U is denoted by Cu. A choice at
a personal information set is called a personal choice. A
choice which is not personal is a random choice. We say
that the vertex x comes after the choice c if one of the ed-
ges in c is on the path to x. In this case we also say that
c i8 on the path to x.
The probability assignement: A probability distribution Pu
over Cu is called completely mixed if it assigns a positive
probability pu(c) to every CtCu. The probability assign-
ment p is a function which assigns a completely mixed pro-
bability distribution Pu over Cu to every UtUo. (p specifies
the probabilities of the random choices.)
The payoff function: the payoff function h assigns a vector
h(z) = (h1 (z) ,...,hn(z» with real numbers as components to
every endpoint z of K. The vector h(z) is called the payoff
vector at z. The component hi(z) is player i's payoff at z.
Perfeet recall: An extensive game r =(K,P,U,C,p,h) is called
an extensive game with perfect recall if the following con-
dition is satisfied for every player i =1,...,n and any two
information sets u and v of the same player i: if one ver-
tex ytV comes afte~ a choice c at u then every vertei XtV
comes after this choice c.3)
3) The concept of perfect recall has been introduced by
H.W. Kuhn (Kuhn 1953)
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Interpretation: In agame with perfect recall a player i who
has to make adecision at one of his information sets v knows
which of his other information sets have been reached by the
previous course of the play and which choices have been taken
there. Obviously a player always must have this knowledge if he
is a person with the ability to rememberwhat he did in the past.
Since game theory is concerned with the behavior of absolute-
ly rational decision makers whose capabilities of reasoning
and memorizing are unlimited, agame, where the players are
individuals rather than teams,must have perfect recall.
Is there any need to consider games where the players are
teams rather than individuals? In the following we shall try
to argue that at least as far as strictly non-cooperative
game theory is concerned the answer to this question is no.
In principle it is always possible to model any given inter-
personal conflict situation in such a way that every person
involved is a single player. Several persons who form a team
in the sense that all of them pursue the same goals can be re-
garded as separate players with identical payoff functions.
Against this view one might object that a team may be united
by more than accidentally identical payoffs. The team may be
a preestablished coalition with special cooperative possi-
bilities not open to an arbitrary collection of persons in-
volved in the situation. This is not a valid objection. Games
with preestablished coalitions of this kind are outside the
framework of strictly non-cooperative game theory. In a strict-
ly non-cooperative game the players do not have any means of
cooperation or coordination which are not explicitly modelled
as parts of the extensive form. If there is something like a pre-
established coalition, then the membersmust appear as sepa-
rate players and the special possibilities of the team must
be apart of the structure of the extensive game.
In view of what has been said no room is left for strictly
non-cooperative extensive games without perfect recall. In
the framework of strictly non-cooperative game theory such
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games can be rejected as misspecified models of interper-
sonal conflict situations.
2. Strategies, expected payoff and normal form
In this section several definitions are introduced which
refer to an extensive game r = (K,P,U,A,p,h).
Local strategies: A local strategy biu at the information
set UEUt is a probability distribution over the set Cu of
the choices at U; a probability biu(c) is assigned to
every choice c at u. A local strategy biu is called pure
if it assigns 1 to one choice c at u and 0 to the other
choices. Wherever this can be done without danger of
confusion no distinction will be made between the choice c
and the pure local strategy which assigns the probability 1
to c.
Behavior strategies: A behavior strategy bi of a personal
player i is a function which assigns a local strategy biu
to every UEUi. The set of all behavior strategies of
player i is denoted by Bi-
Pure strategies: A pure strategy -i of player i is a function
which assigns a choice c at u (a pure local strategy) to
every UEUi. Obviously a pure strategy is a special behavior
strategy. The set of all pure strategies of player i is
denoted by TIi.
Mixed strategies: A mixed strategy qi of player i is a pro-
bability distribution over TIi: a probability qi(~i1 is
assigned to every ~iE TIi. The set of all mixed strategies
qi of player i is denoted by Qi. Wherever this can be done
without danger of confusion no distinction will be made
between the pure strategy -i and the mixed strategy qi
which assigns 1 to -i.pure strategies are regarded as
special cases of mixed strategies.
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Behavior strategy mixtures: a behavior strategy mixture si
for player i is a probability distribution over Bi which as-
signs positive probabilities si (bi) to a finite number of ele-
ments of Bi and zero probabilities to the other elements of
Bi. No distinction will be made between the behavior strategy bi
and the behavior strategy mixture which assigns , to bi. The
set of all behavior strategy mixtures of player i is denoted
by Si. Obviously pure strategies, mixed strategies and behavior
strategies can all be regarded as special behavior strategy
mixtures.
Combinations: A combination s = (s
"
...,s ) of behavior Stra-n -
~ mixtures is an n-tuple of behavior strategy mixtures
SiESi' one for each personal player. Pure strategy combinations
. = (."...'.n)' mixed strategy combinations and behavior
strategy combinations are defined analogously.
Realization probabilities: A player i who plays a behavior
strategy mixture si behaves as follows: He first employs a
random mechanism which selects one of the behavior strategies
bi with the probabilities si (bi). He then in the course of the
play at every UEUi which is reached by the play selects one
of the choices c at u with the probabilities biu(c). Let
s =(s"...,sn) be a combination of behavior strategy mix-
tures. On the assumption that the si are played by the players
we can compute a realization probability p(x,s) of x under s
for every vertex XEK. This probability p(x,s) is the proba-
bility that x is reached by the play, if s is played. Since
these remarks make it sufficiently clear, how p(x,s) is de-
fined, a more precise definition of p(x,s) will not be given
here.
Expected payoffs: With the help of the realization probabili-
ties an expected payoff vector H(s) = (H, (s),...,Hn(S» can
be computed as follows:
(2) H(s) =
~
/' p(z,s)hC:..)
L~.l
ZEZ
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Since pure strategies, mixed strategies and behavior
are special cases of behavior strategy mixtur es, the
payoff definition (2) is applicable here, too.
strategies
expected
Normal form: A normal form G =(n 1,...,n iH) consists of n- n
finite non-empty and pairwise non-intersecting pure strategy
~ ni and an expected payoff function H defined on
n =n1x...xnn. The expected payoff function H assigns a
payoff vector H(.) = (H1 (~) ,...,Hn(t»with real numbers as
components to every tEn . For every extensive game r the
pure strategy sets and the expected payoff function defined
above generate the normal form of r.
In order to compute the expected payoff vector for a mixed
strategy combination, it is sufficient to know the normal
form of r. The same is not true for combinations of behavior
strategies. As we shall see,in the transition from the
extensive form to the normal form some important information
is lost.
3. Kuhn's theorem
H.W. Kuhn has proved an important theorem on games with per-
fect recall (Kuhn 1953, p.213). In this section Kuhn's theo-
rem will be restated in a slightly changed form. For this
purpose some further definitions must be introduced. As be-
fore, these definitions refer to an extensive game r=(K,p,U,A,p,h).
Notational convention: Let
behavior strategy mixtures
tegy mixture for player i.
The combination (s1,...,si-1' ti,si+1,...,sn) which results from
s,if si is replaced by ti a~d the other components of s remain
unchanged,is denoted by s/si. The same notational convention
is also applied to other types of strategy combinations.
s = (s1,...,sn) be a combination of
and let ti be a behavior stra-
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Realization equivalence: Let
gy mixtures for player i. We
tion equivalent if for every
mixtures we have:
si and si be two behavior strate-
say that si and si are realiza-
combination s of behavior strategy
(3)
p(x,s/si) =p(x,s/si) for every XEK
Payoff equivalence:
mlxtures for player
valent if for every
tures we have
Let si and si be two behavior strategy
i. We say that si and si are payoff equi-
combination s of behavior strategy mix-
(4) H(s/si) - H(s/si)
Obviously si and si are payoff equivalent if they are reali-
zation equivalent, since (3) holds for the endpoints z.
Theorem 1 (Kuhn's theorem): In every extensive gamewith
perfect recall a realization equivalent behavior strategy bi
can be found for every behavior strategy mixture si of a per-
sonal player i.
In order to prove this theorem we introduce some further de-
finitions.
Conditional choice probabilities: Let s = (s, ,...sn) be
a combination of behavior strategy mixtures and let x be
a vertex in an information set u of a personal player i,
such that p(x,s» o. For every choice c at u we define a
conditional choice probability ~(c,x,s). The choice c
contains an edge e at Xi this edge e connects x with
another vertex y. The probability ~ (c,x,s) is computed
as follows:
(5) _ p (y,s)
~ (c,x,s) - p (x,s)
The probability
that the choice
been reached.
~(c,x,s) is the conditional probability
c will be taken if ~ is played and x has
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Lemma 1: In every extensive game r (with or without per-
feet reeall) on the region of those triples (e,x,s) where
the eonditional ehoice probability ~(c,x,s)is defined
the eonditional choiee probabilities ~(e,x,s) with XEUEUi
do not depend on the eomponents s' of s with i;j.J
Proof: Let bi,...,b~ be the behavior strategies,which are
seleeted by si with positive probabilities si(bI).For
p(x,s) >0 an outside observer,who knows that e has been
reaehed by the play but does not know whieh of the bi has
been selected before the beginning of the game,can use
this knowledge in order to eompute posterior probabi-
lities ti (bi) from the prior probabilities si (bi). T~e
posterior probability ti (bi) is proportional to si (bI) mul-
tiplied by the product of all probabilities assigned
by bi to ehoiees of player i on the path to x. Obviously
the ti (b~) depend on si but not on the other eomponents
of s. The eonditional ehoiee probability ~(c,x,s) ean be
written as follows:
k
~., ,.
.' J J
(6) ).I (c,x,s) =/_, ti (bi) biu (e)
j=1
This shows that p(e,x,s) does not depend on the Sj with i;j.
Lemma 2: In every extensive game r with per feet reeall,
on the region of those triples (c,x,s) where the eondi-
tional choice probability ).I(e,x,s) is defined, we have
(7) )j(e,x,s) =).I(e,y,s) for XEU and YEU
Proof: In agame with perfeet reeall for XEU,YEU and
UEUi player i's ehoices on the path to x are the same
ehoiees as his ehoices on the path to y. (This is not
true for games without per feet reeall). Therefore at x
and y the posterior probabilities for the behavior stra-
tegies bi oecurring in player ils behavior strategy mixture
si are the same at both vertices. Consequently (7) fol-
- 10
lows from (6).
Proof of Kuhn's theorem: In view of lemma 1 and lemma2 the
conditional choice probabilities at the vertices x in the
player set Pi of a personal player can be described by a
function ~i (c,u,si) which depends on his behavior strategy
mixture s1 and the information set u with XEU.
With the help of ~i(c,u,si) we aonltruct the behavior strate-
gy bi whose existence is asserted by the theorem. If for
at least one s = (s1,...,sn) with si as component we have
~(x,s) > 0 for some XEU, we define
The construction of
ry local strategies
be found.
bi is completed by assigning arbitra-
biu to those UEUi where no such s can
It is clear that this behavior strategy bi and the behavior
strategy mixture si are realizazion equivalent.
The significance of Kuhn's theorem: The theorem shows
that in the context of extensive games with perfect re-
call one can restrict one's attention to behavior strate-
gies. Whatever a player can achieve by a mixed strategy
or a more general behavior strategy mixtures can be achiev-
ed by the realization equivalent and therefore also payoff
equivalent bahavior strategy whose existence is secured by
the theorem.
4. Subgame perfect equilibrium points
In this section we shall introduce some further definitions
which refer to an extensive game r = (K,P,U,A,p,h) with
perfect recall. In view of Kuhn's theorem only behavior
strategies are important for such games. Therefore the
concepts of a best reply and an equilibrium point are
formally introduced for behavior strategies only.
- " -
Best
vior
reply: Let
strategies
best reply
b = (b"...,bn) be a combination of beha-
!\,
for r. A behavior strategy Di of player i
to b if we haveas a
(9)
~ ~ ~
A combination of behavior strategies B = (o"...,Dn) is
called a best reply to b if for i =',...,n the behavior
~
str~tegy 0i is a best reply to b.
~~librium point: A behavior
" " {e
b = (b"...,bn) is called
is a best reply to itself.
strategy combination
{e
an equilibrium point if b
Remark: The concepts
point can be defined
mixtures. In view of
of a best reply and an equilibrium
analogously for behavior strategy
Kuhn's theorem it is clear that for
games with perfect recall an equilibrium point in behavior
strategies is a special case of an equilibrium point in be-
havior strategy mixtures. The existence of an equilibrium
point in behavior strategies for every extensive gamewith
perfect recall is an immediate consequence of Kuhn's theorem
together with Nash's weIl known theorem on the existence of
an equilibrium point in mixed strategies for every finite
game (Nash '951).
Subgame: Let r = (K,P,U,A,p,h) be an extensive game with or
without perfect recall. A subtree K' of K consists of a
vertex x of K together with all vertices after x and all
edges of K connecting vertices of K'. A subtree K' is called
regular in r, if every information set in r, which contains
at least one vertice of K', does not contain any vertices
outside of K'. For every regular subtree K' a subgame
r' -= (K', p.',U',A',p',h') is defined as foliows: P',U',A',p'
and h' are the restrictions of the partitions U,A and the
functions p and h to K'.
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Induced strateg1es: Let r' be a subgameof rand let
b = (b1,... ,bn) be a behav10r strategy comb1nat1on for r.
The restr1ction of b1 to the 1nformation sets of player i
in r' 1s a strategy bI of player i for r'. This strategy bI
1s called 1nducedby b1 on r' and the behavior strategy
combination b' = (b;,...,b~)defined in this way is called
induced by b on r'.
Subgameperfectness: A subgameperfeet equilibrium point
. . .
b = (bi,...,bn) of an extensive game r is an equilibrium
point (in behavior strategies) which induces an equilibrium
point on every subgameof r.
5. A numerical example
The definition of a subgameperfeet equilibrium point ex-
cludes some cases of intu1tively unreasonable equilibrium
points for extensive games. In this section we shall present
a numerical example which shows that not every intuitively
unreasonable equilibrium point is excluded by this defini-
tion. The discussion of the example will exhibit the nature
of the difficulty.
The numerical example is the gameof figure 1. Obviously
this game has no subgames. Every player has exactly one
information set. The game is agame with perfeet recall.
Since every player has two choices, Land R, a behavior
strategy of player i can be characterized by the probability
with which he selects R. The symbol Pi will be used for
this probability. A combinat1on of behavior strategies is
represented by a triple (P1,P2,P3).
As the reader can verify for himself without much difficul-
ty the game of figure 1 has the following two types of equi-
librium points:
Type 1: P1 = 1, P2 = 1, o t:- L 1- P3 - 4'
Type 2: P1 = 0,
1
P - 1- L. P /, 1 ,3- 2 .... 3 -
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Consider the equilibriurn points of type 2. Player 2's
information set is not reached, if an equilibriurn
point of this kind is played. Therefore his expected
payoff does not depend on his strategy. This is the
reason why his equilibrium strategy is best reply to
the equilibriurn strategies of the other players.
o
o
o
:3
2
2
o
o
1
41
~I
Figure 1: A nurnerical exarnple. Information sets
are represented by dashed lines. Choices are indi-
cated by the letters Land R (standing for "left"
and "right"). Payoff vectors are indicated by colurnn
vectors above the corresponding endpoints.
- 14 -
Now suppose that the players believe that a specific
type 2 equilibrium point, say (0,1,1) is the rational
way to play the game. Is it really reasonable to be-
lieve that player 2 will choose R if he is reached?
If he believes that player 3 will choose R as prescrib-
ed by the equilibrium point, then it is better for
hirn to select L where he will get 4 instead of R where
he will get 1. The same reasoning applies to the ~ther
type 2 equilibrium points, too.
Clearly, the type 2 equilibrium points cannot be re-
garded as reasonable. Player 2's choices should not be
guided by his payoff expectations in the whole game
but by his conditional payoff expectations at x3. The
payoff expectation in the whole game is computed on the
assumption that player 1's choice is L. At x3 this as-
sumption has been shown to be wrong. Player 2 has to
assurne that player 1's choice was R.
For every strategy combination (P1,P2,P3) it is possible
to compute player 2's conditional payoff expectations
for his choices Land R on the assumption that his in-
formation set has been reached. The same cannot be done
for player 3. Player 3's information set can be reached
in two ways. Consider an equilibrium point of type 1,
e.g. the equilibrium point (1,1,0). Suppose that (1,1,0)
is believed to be the rational way to play the game
and assume that contrary to the expectations generated
by this belief, player 3's information set is reached.
In this case player 3 must conclude that either player 1
or player 2 must have deviated from the rational way
of playing the game but he does not know which one.
He has no obvious way of cornputing a conditional proba-
bility distribution over the vertices in his information
set, which teIls hirn, with which probabilities he is
at x1 and at x2 if he has to rnake his choice.
- 15 -
In the next seetion a model will be introdueed whieh is
based on the idea that with some very small probability
a player will make amistake. These mistake probabili-
ties do not direetly generate a eonditional probability
distribution over the vertiee of player 3's information
set. As we shall see in seetion 8 the introduetion of
slight mistakes may lead to a strategie situation where
the rational strategies add some small voluntary deviations
to the mistakes.
6. A model of slight mistakes
There eannot be any mistakes if the players are abso-
lutely rational. Nevertheless, a satisfaetory interpre-
tation of equilibrium points in extensive games seems'
to require that the possibility of mistakes is not
eompletely exeluded. This ean be achieved by a point of
view whieh looks at complete rationality as a lirniting
ease of ineomplete rationality.
Suppose that the personal players in an extensive game r
with perfeet recall are subjeet to a slight imperfeetion
of rationality of the following kind. At every information
set u there is a small positive probability E for theu
breakdown of rationality. Whenever rationality breaks
down, every choiee c at u will be seleeted with sorne
positive probability q whieh may be thought of as de-c
termined by sorne unspecified psychological meehanisrn.
Eaeh of the probabilities E and q is assurned to beu e
independent of all the other ones.
Suppose that the rational choice
whieh seleets e with probability
bability of the choiee c will be
at u is a local strategy
p . Then the total pro-c
The introduetion of the probabilities EU and qc transforms~
the original garne into a changed game r where the players
do not eompletely eontrol their choiees. A garne of this
- 16 -
kind will be called a perturbed game of r.
Obviously, it is not important whether the Pc or the
ßc are consider~d to be the strategic variables of the
perturbed game r. In the following we shall take theA
latter point of view. This means that in r every player
i selects a behavior strategy which assigns probability
distributions over the choices c at u to the information
sets u of player i in such a way that the probability pc
assigned to a choice c at u always satisfies the fol-
lowing condition:
(10)
The probability p is also restricted by the upper boundc
1-cu(1-qc); it is not necessary to introduce this upper
bound explicitly since it is implied by the lower bounds
on the probabilities of the other choices at the same
information set. With the help of the notation
condition (10) can be rewritten as follows:
(12) for every personal choice c.
Consider a system of positive constants EC for the perso-
nal choices c in r such that
(13) L nc < 1
c at Cu
Obviously for every system of this kind we can determine
positive probabilities E and q which generate a per-
A u c
turbed game r whose conditions (10) coincide with the
conditions (12). Therefore we may use the following
definition of a perturbed game.
A
Definition: A perturbed game r ie a pair (r,n) where r is
an extensive game with perfect recall and n is a function
- 17 -
which assigns a positive probability nc to every personal
ahoice c in r such that (13) is satisfied.
The probabilities" are called minimumprobabilities.c
For every choice c at a personal information set u define
(14) ~ =1 + "C C 1"1' ,C
c'at u
obviously ~c is the upper bound of Pc implied
conditions (7). This probability ~ is calledc
probability of c.
by the
the maximum
Strategies: A local strategy for the perturbed game
A
r - (r,n) is a local strategy for r which satisfies theA
conditions (12). A behavior strategy of player i in r is a
behavior strategy of player i in r which assigns local
A
strategies for r to the information sets of pla~er i. The
set of all behavior strategies of player i for r is denot-. .
ed by Bi. A behavior strategy combination for r is a be-
havior strategy combination D = (D 1,...,B ) for r whoseA n
components are behavior strategies for r. The set of all
A A
behavior strategy combinations for r is denoted by B.
Best replies: Let b =(b1,...,b ) be a behavior strategy
A n ~
comb:nation for r. A behavior strateg~ 0i of player i
for r is called a best reply to b in r if we have
(15)
~ ~ ~ A
A behavior strategy combination D = (D1,...,5 )for r is
. n ~
called a best reply to b.in r if every component 5i of bi
is a best reply to b in r.
Equilibrium point: An equilibrium point of.
strategy co mbin at ion for r wh ich is a best
A
in r.
r is a behavior
reply to itself
- 18 -
Remark: Note that there is a difference between a best
A A
reply in rand a best reply in r. The strategy sets Bi
are subsets of the st:ategy sets Bi. Pure strategies
are not available in r.
7. Perfect equilibrium points
The difficulties which should be avoided by a satisfactory
definition of a perfect equilibrium point are connected
to unreached information sets. There cannot be any un-
reached information sets in the perturbed game. If b is
a behavior strategy combination for the perturbed game
then the realization probability p(x,b) is positive for
every vertex x of K. This makes it advantageous to look
A
at agame r as a limiting case of perturbed games r= (r,n).
In the following a perfect equilibrium point will be de-
fined as a limit of equilibrium points for perturbed
games .
Sequences of perturbed games: Let r be an extensive game
A1 A2
with perfect recall. A sequence r , r ,... wherefor
Ak k
k = 1,2,... the game r = (r,n ) is a perturbed game of r,
18 called a test sequence for r, if for every choice c of
the personal players in r the sequence of the minimum
k k
probabilities n assigned to c by n converges to 0 forc
k +-.
A1 A2
Let r , r , ... be a test sequence for r. A behavior
~
strategy combination b for r is called a limit equilibrium
point of this test sequence if for k =1,~,... an equili-
Ak Ak
brium point b of r can be found such that for k+- the
Ak .
sequence of the b converges to b .
.
Lemma3: A limit equilibrium point b of a test sequence
A1 A2
r , r ,... for an extensive gamer with perfect recall
is an equilibrium point of r.
k
Proof: The fact that the bare equilibrium points of the
Ak
r can be expressed by the following inequalities
- 19 -
(16 )
"'"k
biEBi and
"'"k
Bi with k
for i=1,...,n.
Let ~be the interseetion of all
k~ m we have
~ m. For
Sinee the expeeted payoff depends eontinuously on the be-
habior strategy eombination this inequality remains va-
lid if on both sides we take the limits for k+-. This yields:
(18 )
Inequality (18) holds
m
of all Bi is Bi. This
yields:
for every m. The elosure of the union
together with the eontinuity of Hi
(19 )
Inequality (19) shows that b is an equilibrium point of r.
Per feet equilibrium point: Let r be an extensive gamewith
perfeet reeall. A perfeet equilibrium point of r is a be-
R R R
havior strategy eombination b = (b1,...,b n) for r with the
, "'"1 "'"2
property that for at least one test sequenee r , r
J..
...
R 1 "'"2
the eombination b is a limit equilibrium point of r ,r ,...
R
Interpretation: A limit equilibrium point b of a test se-
quenee has the property that it is possible to find equili-*
brium points of perturbed games as elose to b as desired.
The definition of aperfeet equilibrium point is apreeise
statement of the intuitive idea that a reasonable equili-
briums point should have an interpretation in terms of arbi-
trarily small imperfeetions of rationality. A test se-R
quenee whieh has b as limit equilibrium point provides
R
an interpretation of this kind. If b fails to be the limit
*
equilibrium point of at least one test sequenee b must be
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regarded as instable against very small deviations from per-
feet rationality.
Up to now it has not been shown that perfeetness implies sub-
game perfeetnes. In order to do this we need a lemmaon the
subgameperfectness of equilibrium points for perturbed games.
Subgamesof perturbed ~ames: Let r = (~,~) be a perturbed
game of r. A subgame r' = (f',n') of r consists of a subgame
r' of rand the restriction ~' of n to the personal choices
A
of r'. We say that r' is generated by r'. An equilibrium
A A .
~oint b of r is called subgame ~erfec~ if an equilibrium point
b' is indueed on every subgamer' of r.
Lemma 3: Let r be an extensive game with perfect reeall and~
let r = (r,n) be a perturbed game of r. Every equilibrium pointA
of r (in behavior strategies) is subgame perfect.
Proof: Let b' be the behavior strategy combination induced
A A
by an equilibrium point b of r on a subgame r' of r. Obvious-A
ly b' is a behavior strategy combination for the subgame
A A
r' =(r',n') generated by r'. Suppose that b' fails to be an
A
equilibrium point of r'. It follows that for some personal. A
player j a behavior strat;qy bj forAr' exist, such that player
j's expected payo!f forAb'/bj in r' is greater than his ex-
peeted payoff for b' in r'. Consider the behavior strategyA
bj fo~ r wh~ch agrees with bj on r' and with player j's stra-
tegy bj in Ab everywhere else. Since the realization probabi-
liti=s in rare always positive player j's expected payoff
for b/bj must be greater than his expected payoff for b.
Since aAbehavior strategy bj with thi~ property does not
eXist, b' is an equilibrium point of r'.
Theorem 2: Let r be an extensive game with perfect recall and
let ~ be a perfect equilibrium point of r. On every sub-
~
game r' of r a perfect equilibrium point b' is induced by
~ on r'.
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Corollary :
game r with
point of r.
Every perfect equilibrim point of an extensive
perfect recall is a subgameperfect equilibrium
'"'1 '"'2
Proof: Let r , r ,... be a test sequence for r which has b as
""" '"'2
limit equilibrium point. Let b ; b ,... be a sequenceof equi-
'"'k '"'k
librium points b of r . It follows from the subgame perfectness
'"'k '"'k
of the b that the subqames of r generated by r'form a test
'"
sequence for r' with b' as a limit equilibrium point. Therefore
~
51 is a perfect equilibrium point of r'.
The corollary is an immediate consequence of the fact that a
perfeet equilibrium point is an equilibrium point. (See lemma 3.)
8. A second look at the numerical example
In this section we shall first look at a special test sequence
of the numerical example of figure , in order to compute its
limit equilibrium point. The way in which this limit equilibrium
point is approached exhibits an interesting phenomenon which
is important for the interpretation of perfect equilibrium
points. Later we shall show that every equilibrium point of
type , is perfect.
Let €1'€2"" be a monotonically decreasing sequence of positive
,
probabilities with €,
< _
4 and €k +0 for k + -. Let rbe the game
'"'1 '"'2
of figure 1. Consider the following test sequence r , r ,... for r.
'"'k k
For k = 1,2,... the perturbed game r =(y,~ ) is defined by
k
~c = €k for every choice c of r.
As in section 6 let Pi be the probability of player ils choice R.
A behavior strategy combination can be represented ba a triple
'"'k
p = (P1,P2,P3)' The behavior strategy combinations for rare
restricted by the condition
for i = 1,2,3
As we
point
'"'k
ahall see, the perturbed game r
k k k k
P = (P1,P2,P3 ) whose components
has only one equilibrium
k
Pi are as follows:
'22
k
Equilibrium property of p: In the following it will be shown
k Ak
that p is an equilibrium point of r . Let us first look at
the situation of player 3. For any p = (P"P2,P3) the reali-
zation probabilities p(x"p) and p(x2,p) of the vertices x,
and x2 in the information set of player 3 are given by (24)
and (25).
(24 ) p(x"p) ='-p,
(25 )
Player 3's expected payoff under the condition that his
information set is reached is 2p(x,p) if he takes his choice R
and p(x2,p) ifAhe takes his choice L. Therefore P3 is a best
reply to p in rk if and only if the following is true:
(29)
(30)
Therefore it follows by (27) that p~ is a best reply to pk.
k
(21) P1 =1 - Ek
2Ek
(22) k _ 1 _ _
P2 - 1-Ek
k 1
(23) P3 = 4"
(26) P3 = Ek for 2 (1-p,) < P, (1-P2)
(27 ) Ek P3 {'-e:k for 2(1-p,) =P1(1-P2)
(28 ) P3 =1-Ek for 2 (1-P1) > P1 (1-P2)
In the case of P
k we have
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Let us now look at the situation of player 2. Here we can
Ak
see that P2 is a best reply to p in r if and only if the
following is true:
k k
P2 is best reply to P in view of (32).
Ak
P1 is a best reply to P in r if and only if the following
is true:
Uniqueness of the equilibrium point: In the following it
k Ak
will be shown that P is the only equilibrium point of r .
We first exclude the possibility P3 ~ 1/4. Suppose that
p is an equilibrium point with P3 < 1/4. It follows by
(33) that we have P2 =1-e:k. Concequently 3P3 is smaller
than P2 and (36) yields P1 =1-e:k. Therefore (28) applies
to P3. Wehave P3 =1-Ek contrary to the assumption P3 < 1/4.
Now we suppose
Condition (31)
condition (36)
to P3 contrary
that P is an equilibrium point with P3 > 1/4.
yields P2 =Ek. In view of 1-P2 > 3/4
applies to P1. It follows that (26) applies
to the assumption P3 > 1/4.
1
(31) P2 =Ek for P3 > '4
1
(32 ) Ek P2 1-Ek for P3 =4"
(33 ) P2 =1-Ek for P3 < 1.4
(34) P1 =€k for 3P3 > 4(1-P2)P3+P2
(35 ) Ek P1 1-e:k for 3P3 =4 (1-P2)P3+P2
(36) P1 = 1-e:k for 3P3 < 4 (1-P2)P3+P2
k k
(36) .P1 is a best reply to p in view of
Ak
We know now that an equilibrium point p of r must have the
1
Obviously (36) applies to an equilibriumproperty P3 =4".
point p. We must have P1 =1-e:k . Moreover neither (26) nor
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(28) are satisfied by P3. Therefore in view of (27) an
equilibrium point p has the following property:
(37 )
This together with P1 =1-Ek yields
2Ek
P2 = 1-&,k
(38)
equilibrium point:
For k+- the
This is the
"'1
sequence r ,
.
converges to p =(1,1,1/4).
equilibrium point of the test
k . k
Note that P1 is as near as possible to P1 =1 since P1
k
is the maximumprobability 1 - Ek. Contrary to this P2* *
is not as near as possible to P2. The probability P2 is
smaller than 1 - Ek by Ek(1+€k) / (1 - Ek). The rules of
the perturbed game force player 2 to take his choice L
with a probability of at least Ek but to this minimum
probability he adds the "voluntary" probability
€k(1+€k) / (1-€k). In this sense we can speak of a vo-
luntary deviation from the limit equilibrium point.
The voluntary deviation influences the realization proba-
k k
bilities p(x1,p ) and p(x2,p ). The conditional probabi-
lities for x] and x2,if the information set of player 3 isR '
reached by p , are 1/3 and 2/3 for every k. It is natural
to think of these conditional probabilities as conditional*
probabilities for the limit equilibrium point p ,too,
The assumptions on the probabilities of slight mistakes
"'1 "'2
which are embodiedin the test sequence r , r ,... do not
directly determine these conditional probabilities but
k
indirectly via the quilibrium points p
Perfectness of the equilibrium points of type 1: In the fol-
lowing it will be shown that every equilibrium point of
. .
type 1 is perfect. Let p =(1,1,P3) be one of these equili-
"'1 '"
brium points. Weconstruct a test sequence r , r2, ...
- 25
11
with the property that p i8 a limit equilibrium point of
1 2
r , r ,... . Let E1, E2,... be a decreasing sequence of
'* .
positive numbers with E1 < P3' /2 and Ek + 0 for k + 00.
. k .
The minimum orobabilities "c for the perturbed gamek k
r = (r,n ) are defined as follows:
(39)
kn =c if c is a choice of player 2.
if c is a choice of player 1 or player 3
With the help of arguments similar to those which have been
k
used in the subsection "equilibrium property of p ", it can
be shown that for k =1,2,... the following behavior stra-
Ak k k k
~~g" combination t' = (1'1' P2' P3) is an equilibrium point ofr
(42 )
1'1 =1-Ek
2Ek
1'2 = 1 - r=Ek
'*
1'3 =P3
(40)
(41 )
1 2 '* '*
The sequence p , p , ... converges to p . Therefore p is
a perfect equilibrium point.
Imperfectness of the equilibrium points of type 2: In the
following it will be shown that the equilibrium points of
'* '*
type 2 fails to be perfect. Let p = (0,P 2,1) be an equili-1 2
brium point of type 2 and let r , r ,... be a test aequence
'* 1 2
which has p as limit equilibrium point. Let p , p , ... be
'* k
a sequence of equilibrium points p of r which for k+- con-
'*
verges to p. For every E>O we can find a number met:) auch
that for k > met) the following two conditions (a) and (b)
k "k k
are satisfied. (a) Every mini.um probability n in r - (r,o )c
- 26
is smaller than E. (b) For i =1,2,3 we have * k
I Pi -P il < E.
and (b) thatFor suffieiently small E it follows from (a)
k k
P2 is not a best reply to P ; we must have P2 < E for
k k
player 2's best reply to p anQ P2 eannot be below 1/3 by*
more than E. This shows that p eannot be the limit equili-
brium point of a test sequenee.
9. A deeentralization erfeet eauilibrium points
In this seetion it will be shown that the question whether
a given behavior strategy eombination is aperfeet equili-
brium point or not, ean be deeided loeally at the information
sets of the game. The eoneept of a loeal equilibrium point
will be introdueed whieh is defined by eonditions on the
loeal strategies. As we shall see, in perturbed games these
loeal eonditions are equivalent to the usual global equili-
brium eonditions. On the basis of this result a deeentralized
deseription of aperfeet equilibrium point will be developed.
Notational eonvention: Let r be an extensive game and let bi
be a behavior strategy of a personal player i in r. Let
biu be a loeal strategy at an information set u of player i.
The notation bi/biu is used for that behavior strategy
whieh results from bi if the loeal strategy assigned by bi to
u is ehanged to biu whereas the loeal strategies assigned
by bi to other information sets remain unehanged. Let
b = (b"...,bn) be a behavior strategy eombination. The no-
tation b/biu is used for the behavior strategy combination,b/bi
with bi = bi/biu. ThG set of all loeal strategies at u 18 .
denoted by Biu.
Loeal best replies: Let b = (b" ...,b ) be a behav10r strategyn ~
eornbination for an extensive game rand let. D1u be a loeal
strategy at an information set U of a personal player 1. The
~
loeal strategy Diu is ealled a loeal best reply to b 1n r 1f
we have
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(43 )
Local best replies
fined analogously:
we have
.
in a perturbed game r - (r,~) are de-
~ A
Diu is a local ~ reply !2 b in r if
(44)
A A
where Biu is the set of all local strategies at u for r.
A
Conditional realization probabilities: Let r= (r,n) be a
perturbed qame of an extensive game r with perfeet recall.
Por every information set u of a personal player i and
every behavior strategy combination b = (b"...,bn) for r
we define a c~nditional realizat10n probability n(x,b)
A
p (x, b)
(45) p(x,b) =
p (y, b)
Obviously p(x,b) is the conditional probab1l1ty that x 1s
reached by the play if b is played and u is reached. Since
p(x,b) is positive for every vertex x, the conditional real1-
zation probability p(x,b) is defined for every vertex x.
Let x be a vertex and let z be an endpoint after x. We de-
fine a second type of conditional realization probability
n(x,z,b) which is the probability that z will be reached if b
is played and x has been reached. Obviously we have
(46) =p(z,b)p(x,b)
Conditional expected payoff: For every information set u of
A
a personal player i in a perturbed game r= (r ~) of an exten-
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sive game r with perfect recall we define a conditional ex-
pected payoff funtion Hiu for player i at u:
~ ~
(47) Hiu (b) - ~ "(x,b) ~(X'Z'b)h(Z)
XEU Z after x
Hiu(b) is the conditional expectation of player i's payoff
under the condition that b is played and u is reached by
the play.
Lemma4: Let b = (b1,...,b ) be a behavior strategy com-n .
bination for a perturbed game r =(r,~) of an extensive
game r with perfect recall. The conditional realization
probabilities ~(x,b) do not depend on bi.
Proof: In agame with perfect recall the information sets
u of a personal player i have the property that the same
choices of player i are on every path to a vertex XEU.
Therefore ~(x,b) does not depend on bi.
Lemma 5: Let b = (b 1,...,b ) be a behavior strategy combi-n .
nation for a perturbed game r = (r,~) of an extensive
~
game r with perfect recall and let Di be a local strategy. u
for r at an information set u of a personal player i. The
~ .
tocal strategy Diu is a local best reply to b in r if
and only if the following is true:
(48)
Proof: The assertion of the lemmafollows from the fact
that the local strategy at u does not influence the reali-
zation probabilities of endpoints which do not come after
vertices of u.
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....
Now we assume that bi is not a best reply to b in r. With the~
notation b/bi/Div for bIbi we can write
(49)
In the foll~wing we shall show that biv is a local best reply
to bibi in r. This is a contradiction to (49).
It follows by lemma 4 that we have
(50)
for every XEV and every loeal strategy biv Cf player i at v.
Moreover the information set v has been seleeted in such a
way that bi and ~i assign the same probabilities to ehoiees
at information sets u after v. Therefore we have
(51 )
for every local strategy biv at v and for every XEV. (47) to-
gether with (50) and (51) yields
(52)
~ ~
Since bi is a loeal best reply to bIbi it i8 a eon.equeneev ~
of lemma 5 and equation (52) that Div is a local best reply
to bIbi. This contradietion to (49) eompletes the proof of
lemma 6.
Local e~uilibrium points: A behavior strategy eombination* *
b = (b1,...,b ) for an extensive game r is ealled a loe_l equili-n ....
brium pOint for r or for a perturbed game r of r if"every loeal*
strategy bi whieh is assigned to an information set u by on. of* u ....
the bi is a local best reply to b in r or r, re.p.
. . *
Lemma7: A behavior strategy eombination b - (b1,...,b )n
for a perturbed game r =(r,n) of an extensive game r with
....
perfeet recall is an equilibrium point for r,if and only if
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*
b is a loca1 equi1ibrium point for r.
Proof: The lemma is an immediate consequence of lemma 6.
A1 A2
Loca1 limit equi1ibrium points: Let r ,r ,... be a test
sequence for an extensive game r with perfect reca11.
. * *
A behavior strategy combination b = (b"...,bn) for r is
ca11ed a loca1 limit equi1ibrium pOint of the test se-
A1 -2 -k
quence r , r ,... if every r has a loca1 equi1ibrium
k k
point b such that for k+- the sequence of the'b conver-*
ges to b .
Theorem 3: A behavior strategy combination b* = (b~,...,b~)
for an extensive game r with perfect reca11 is a perfect
equi1ibrium point of r, if and on1y if ,for at least one
A1 A2
test sequence r , r , ... for r the behavior strategy*
combination b is a loca1 limit equi1ibrium point of the
A1 A2
test sequence r , r ,...
Proof: The theorem is an immediate consequence of lemma7
and the difinition of a perfect equi1ibrium point.
10. The agent normal form and the existence of a perfect
equi1ibrium point
In this section the concept of an agent normal form will
be introduced. The p1ayers of the agent normal form are
the agents of the information sets described by H.W. Kuhn
in his interpretation of the extensive form (Kuhn 1953).
An agent receives the expected payoff of the p1ayer to
whomhe belongs. The agent normal form contains all the
information which is needed in order to compute the
perfect equilibrium points of the extensive game. With
the he1p of the agent normal form one can prove the
existence of perfect equilibrium points for extensive
games with perfect reca11.
The agent normal form: Let r be an extensive game and
let u1,...,QN be the information sets of the personal
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players in r. For i =1,...,N let 'i be the set CUi of
all choices at ui. In the following we shall define a
normal form G = ('1'..."N,E) where the players 1,...,N
are thought of as agents associated with the information
sets u"...,~. This normal form is called the agent
normal form of r.
Let , be the set of all pure strategy combinations
, = (~"..."n)for G. For every ,E' the expected payoff
vector E(') =(E, (,),...,En(,» is defined as follows:
Let _ =(."...'-n) be the pure strategy combination
for r whose components assign the choice 'jE9j to every
information set uj. For this _ we have
(53)
The expected payoff function E is extended to the mixed
strategy combinations q =(q"...,qN) of G in the usual
way.
Induced strategy combinat~ons: Let b = (b"...,bn) be
a behavior strategy combjnation for rand let
q = (q"...,gN) be a mixed stratey combination for the
agent normal form G of r. We say that q is induced
by b on G and that b is induced on r by q if for
i =1,...,N the mixed strategy qi is the same proba-
bility distribution over Ri as the local strategy as-
Signed to ui by the relevant component of b. Obvious-
ly this use of the word "induced" defines a one-to-one
mapping between the behavior strategy combination b
of rand the mixed strategy combinations q of G.
Perturbed agent normal forms: Let G be a normal form
G = ("'..."N,E) and let n be a function which assigns
positive minimumprobabilities nc to every CE'i with
i =,,...,N, subject to the restrietion
(54) 11 <,C
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....
The pair G = (G,n) is called a perturhed normal ~ of G.
A mixed strategy qi for G is a mixed strategy for G = (G,n)
if qi satisfies the following condition:
(55) for every CE:~i
A mixed strategy combination q ~ (q"...,qN) is called a
mixed strategy combination for G = (G,n) if fo~ i = ',...,N
the mixed strategy qi is a mixed strate2Y for G. The se: of
all mixed strategies qi of player i in G is denoted by Qi .
Let r be an extensive game and let G be the agent normal form
of r. Obviously a behavior strateqy combination for the perturbed
....
game r-(r,n} is induced on r by every mixed strategy cOmbina-....
tion for the perturbed normal form G = (G,n) and vice versa.....
We call G the perturbed agent normal form of r.
~
Equilibrium points: A mixed strategy qi of a player i i~ a per-
turbed normal form G =(G,n) is called a best reply to G to
....
the mixed strategy combination q = (q"...,qN) for G if we
have
(56) max
A mixed strategy combination
.... ~
reply to q in G, if every qi
A mixed strategy combination*
point of G, if q is a
~ ~ ~
q = (q"...,qN}is called a best
~ ---,r-
in q is a best reply to q in G.
'Ir ....
q for G is called an equilibrium
....
best reply to itself in G.
....
Lemma 8: Let G = (G,n) be the perturbed agent normal form of
....
the perturbed game r = (r,n) of an extensive game r with per-....
feet recall. An equilibrium point of r is induced on r by
....
every equilibrium point of G and an equilibrium point of G is
....
induced on G by every equilibrium point of r.
....
Proof: It is clear that a local best reply in r corresponds
....
to a best reply in G. Therefore the assertion follows by lem-
ma 7.
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Perfect equilibrium points: A test
a normal form G = (~ 1 ""'~ N,E) isAk k
normal forms G = (r,,~ ) of G such
k
quence of the ~c converges to 0 for every c in the sets Ri '
* A1 A2
A limit equilibrium point q of a test sequence G ,G ,...
is a mixed strategy combination for G, such that there 1s
1 2
at least one sequence q ,q ,... of equilibrium points
k Ak *
q for Gwhich for k+mconverges to q . A perfect ~
l1brium point of G is a mixed strategy combination q for
Gwhich is a limit equilibrium point of at least one test
A1 A2
sequence G ,G ,... for G.
A1 A2
sequence G ,G ,... for
a sequence of perturbed
that for k+m the se-
Lemma 9:
-1 A2
G , G ,...
*
A limit equilibrium point q of a test sequence
for a normal form G is an equilibrium point of G.
Proof: The proof is omitted here since it is completely
analogous to the proof of lemma 3.
Theorem 4: Let r be an extensive game with perfect re-
call an4 let G be the agent normal form of r. A perfect
equilibrium point of r is induced on r by every perfect
equilibrium point of G and a perfect equilibrium point
of G is induced on G by every perfect equilibrium point
of r.
Proof: It follows by lemma 8 that a one-to-one relation-
ship between the test sequences for rand for G can be
established where a perturbed game of r corresponds to
its perturbed agent normal form. Therefore a limit equi-
librium point of one of both sequences induces a limit
equilibrium point of the other one.
Existence of perfect equilibrium points: In the follow-
ing it will be shown that every extensive game r with
perfect recall has at least one perfect equilibrium point.
In order to prove this, we makeuse of theorem 4.
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Theorem 5: Every normal form G has at least one perfeet equi-
librium point.
Proof: A perturbed normal for G = (G,~) satisfies weIl known
suffieient eonditions for the existenee of an equilibrium
pOint in mixed strategies (see e.g. Burger, 1958, p. 35,
Ak
Satz 2). Therefore every perturbed normal form G in a test
A1 A2 k
sequeneeG , G ,... for G has an equilibrium point q
Sinee the set of all mixed strategy eombinations is a elos-
1 2
ed and bounded subset of an eneledian spaee, the sequenee q ,q
· 1 2
has an aeeumulation point q . The sequenee q ,q , ... has a
.
subsequenee whieh eonverges to q . The eorresponding subse-
A1 A2
quenee of the test sequenee G , G ,... is a test sequeneewith* *
the limit equilibrium point q . Therefore q is aperfeet
equilibrium point of G.
, . . .
Theorem 6: Every extensive game r with per feet reeall has at
least one perfeet equilibrium point.
Proof: In view of theorem 5 the agent normal form of r has
aperfeet equilibrium point. It follows by theorem 4 that
r has aperfeet equilibrium point.
11. Charaeterization of perfeet equilibrium points as best
replies to substitute sequenees
In this seetion it will be shown that the definition of a
perfeet equilibrium point as a limit equilibrium point of
a test sequenee is equivalent to another definition whieh
is more advantageous from the point of view of mathematieal
simplieity. In view of theorem 4 we ean restriet our attention
to perfeet equilibrium points for normal forms. It is suf-
ficient to analyse the agent normal form if one wants to
find the perfeet equilibrium points of an extensive game
with per feet reeall. It is important to point out that it is
not suffieient to analyse the ordinary normal form This
will be shown in section 12 with the help of a counterexample.
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Substitute sequences: Let G = (fi"...,finiH) be agame
in normal form. A mixed strategy qi of player i is call-
ed completely mixed if for every ~iEfii the probability
qi(~i) assigned to ~i by qi is positive. A mixed strate-
gy combination q = (q"...,qn) is called completely
mixed if qi is completely mixed for i =',...,n. Let
q = (q"...,qn) be a mixed strategy combination for G.
An infinite sequence of mixed strategy combinations
, 2 - k
q ,q ,... is called a substitute sequence for q if q
- k
converges to q for k+m and every q is completely mixed.
A strategy qi or a strategy combination q is called a
, 2
best reE!x to the substitute sequence q ,q ,... if qi or
k
q,resp. is a best reply to every q in the sequence.
Substitute
combination
erfect equilibrium points: A mixed strategy
q = (q1,...,q~) for a normal form G is call-'*
ed a substitute perfeet equilibrium point of G if q is
'*
a best reply to at least one substitute sequence for q
Lemma'0: A substitute perfeet equilibrium point of a
normal form G is an equilibrium point of G.
Proof:
, 2
q , q ,
we have
'*
Let q be a best reply to the substitute sequence
'*
... for q . For k = ',2,... and for i = ',...,n
(57) kmax "i (q /qi)
qi&Qi
In view of the
perties of the
mains valid.if
'*
shows that CJ
continuity of Hi
maximumoperator
on both sides we
and the continuity pro-
it is clear that (57) re-
take limits for k+m. This
is an equilibrium point.
Associated perturbed normal forms: Let G = (fi"...,finiH)
be a normal form, let q = (CJ"...,qn) be a completely
mixed strategy combination for G and let E be a positive
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number such that for i =1,...,n we have qi(~i»E for
every XiEßi. For every triple (G,q,E) of th!s kind we
define an associated perturbed normal form G = (G,") ,
where the minimum probabilities of the pure strategies
for Gare as follows:
(58)
if ~i is not a best reply to q in G
is a best reply to q in G
for i = 1,...,n and for every XiEni" Obviously "
the condition that the minimum probabilities for
strategies of a player sum up to less than 1.
satisfies
all pure
Lemma 11: Let G = (G,~)be the associated
form for the triple (G,q,t). The strategyA
is an equilibrium point of G.
perturbed normal
combination q
Proof: A mixed
pure strategies
used with their
is the case for
strategy is a best reply to q in G if the
which are not best replies to q in Gare
minimum probabilities. In view of (58) this
every component qi of q.
Lemma 12: A substitute perfect equilibrium point of a nor-
mal form G is a perfect equilibrium point of G.
* * *
Proof: Let q = (Q1,...,q ) be a substitute perfect aqui-n 1 2
librium point for G and let q , q ,... be a substitute se-
n * 1 2
quence for q such that q is a best reply to q , q ,... "
Let E1, t2,... be a sequence of positive numbers with
Ek+O for k+m, such that for k=1,2,... and for i = 1,...,nk
w~ always have qi (~i) > Ek for every ~iEITi. Since every
q is completely mixed we can find a sequence E1,E2,... of
Ak k
this kind. Let G = (G,~ ) be the perturbed normal form as-
sociated with the triple (G,qk,E ).n
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A1 A2
In the follwoinq it will be shown that G ,G ,... i9 a test
sequence for G. Obviously for k~m those minimum probabilities
which are equal to Ek converge to O. Consider a pure strate-*
gy -iEITi which is not a best reply to q . For this pure stra-*
tegy we must have qi ( ~i) =0 Therefore for k~mthe minimum
probabilities of pure strategies which are not best replies to
* A1 A2
q converge to 0, too. Consequently, G , G ,... is a test
sequence of G.
The sequence q1, q2,... is a sequence of equilibrium points qk
Ak A1 A2
for the perturbed game G in a test sequence G .G ,... for G.
This follows by lemma 11. Moreover the sequence q1,q2,... con-
* k .
verges to q . Therefore q 1S a limit equilibrium point of the
A1 A2 k
test sequence G ,G ,... . Consequently q is a perfect equ1li-
brium point of G.
* * *
Theorem 7: A mixed strateqy combination q = (q1,...,gn) *
is aperfeet equilibrium point of G, if and only if q is
a substitute perfect equilibrium point of G.
Proof: In view of lemma 12 it remains to be shown that a per--- *
fect equilibrium point q of G is substitute perfect. Let
A 1 A2 *
G , G , ... be a test sequencefor G, such that q is a
A1 A2 1 2
limit equilibrium point of G , G ,... . Let q , q ,... be
k k
a sequenceof equilibrium points q gor Gwhich converges
'"
to g . The definition of a perfect equilibrium point requires
A1 A2 1 2
that such sequences G , G ,... and q , ~ ,... ex1st.
k
Let Ti be the set of all those pure strategies of player i
which appear with more than minimumprobability in qk, i.e.
-i is in T~ ,if and only if we have q~ (-i) > n~ for player
i's component qki in qk. Obviously a pure strateg~ ..ETki isk k 1
a best reply q in G but Ti may not contain every pure best
reply to ~inG. Since the ak converge to q* and the n~ con-i
verge to 0, there must be a number m, such that for k>mevery
'" . k
pure strategy -i with qi(~i) > 0 is 1n Ti for i = 1,...,n.
Without lass of generality we can assume m =0 since otherwise
A1 A2
of the original sequences G , G ,...
for the purpose of this proof.
we can use subsequences
1 2
and q , q ,...
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Since every ~i Wi~h q~(~i) > 0 is in T~ and :very ~i€T~ is
a best reply to q in G, the mixed strategy qi is a best re-
ply to gk for k - 1,2,... . The qk (are completely mixed and
1 2 * 1 2
q , q , ... converges to q . The sequenceq , q ,... is a* *
substitute sequence for 9 and q is a best reply to this*
sequence. q is a substitute perfect equilibriurnpoint.
12. Two counterexamples
One might be tempted to think that a perfect equilibrium
point of the normal form G of an extensive game r with
perfect recall always corresponds to a perfect equilibrium
point of r. If this were the case on would not need the
agent normal form. In the following we shall present two
counterexamples. The first one is quite simple but less
satisfactory than the second one.
The first counterexample: The extensive game of figure 2
has exactly one perfect equilibrium point, namely the pure
strategy combination (Rr,L). Here Rr refers to that pure
strategy of player 1 where he chooses R at the origin and
r at his other information set. The fact that this is the
only perfect equilibrium point follows immediately
subgame perfectness of perfect equilibrium points.
corollary of theorem 2 in section 7).
by the
(See the
In the normal form (Rr,L) is a perfect equilibrium point, too
but not the only one. Since the strategies Rl and Rr are equi-
valent (Rl,L) is just as perfect in the normal form as (Rr,L).
In a perturbed game of the extensive form the strategies Rl
and Rr are not equivalent but this information is lost in the
normal form and cannot be regained by the construction of per-
turbed normal forms.
The first counterexample is not quite satisfactory since the
one may be content with the fact that among the two equivalent
perfect equilibrium points of the normal form, there is one
- 40 -
which is perfeet in the extensive form. One may
of view that it is not important to distinguish
two equilibriurn points.
take the point
between these
L R
Rl
LI
Lr
Rr
Figure 2: Extensive form and normal form for the first
counterexample. The conventions of the graphical
representation of the extensive form are explain-
ed at figure 1.
The second counterexample: Consider the equilibrium points
(Rl, L2, R3) and (Rr, L2, R3) of the qame of figure 3. As
we shall see both of these equilibrium points are perfeet in
the normal form but they fail to be perfeet in the extensive
form.
Perfectness in the normal form: It is sufficient to show
that (Rl, L2, R3) is aperfeet equilibrium point of the
normal form,if this is the ease the same must be true for
(Rr, L2, R3) sinee in the normal form Rr is a duplieate of
Rl.
In order to show the perfeetness of (Rl, L2,R3) we eonstruct
the following substitute sequence q1,q2,... : In qk every
pure strategy wh1ch does not occur in (Rl,L2,R3) 1s used with
2 0
0 2
0 0
3 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
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o
o
5
4
4
o
10
/g
3
o
3
~I
LI
Lr
RI
Rr
LI
Lr
RI
Rr
Figure 3: Extensive form and normal form for the second counter-
example _ The normal form is described by two tri-
matrics one for player 3's choice L3 and one for his
choice R3-
1 2
3 0
0 0
1 0
3 0
0 5
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 2
3 0
0 0
1 4
3 4
0 0
3 3
0 0
3 3
3 3
0 0
3 3
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than 1-( in bk. It ean be seen immediately that for suf-
fieiently small E player 2's best reply to bk is R2.
1 2
Therefore the sequenee b ,b ,... cannot be such that
(Rr,L2,R3) is a best reply to every bk. Consequently
(Rr,L2,R3) fails to be aperfeet equilibrium point of
the game of figure 3.
Interpretation: In the following we shall try to give an
intuitive explanation for the phenomenonthat an equili-
brium point whieh is perfect in the normal form may not
be perfect in the extensive form.
In order to compare the normal form definition with the
extensive form definition, we shall look at a perturbed
A
game r of an extensive game r with perfect reeall and atA
a perturbed normal form G of the normal form G of r.
k k k
Let the behavior strategYAcombination b =(b1,...,bn) be
an equilibrium point for rand let the mixed strategy* A *
eombination g = (Q1,...qn) be an equilibrium point for G.
A
A choiee e in r is ealled essential for b if the relevant
local strategy selects e with more than the minimum pro-A
bability for c required by r. A choice whieh is essential
k k
for b must be a loeal best reply to b in r.
A pure strategy ~i is called essential for qk if q~ (~i)
is greater than the minimum probability for - i required
A *
by G. A pure strategy which is essential for q must" be
'*
a best reply to q in r.
* *
Both band q reach all partsof the extensive form in
the sense that the realization probabilities of all ver-
tices are positive. Nevertheless ther.e is a erucial dif-A *
ference betweenband q . This differenee concerns the
'*
conditional choiee probabilities Pi (e,u,qi) whieh have
been defined with the help of lemma 1 and lemma 2 in the*
proof of Kuhn's theorem. In the ease of q these eondi-
tional choice probabilities are defined for every personal
information set.
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It may happen that player ils pure strategies which are essen-*
tial for q are such that a given information set u is not*
reached by q Ini for every one of these essential strate-*
gies -i; the realization probabilities p(x,q I-i) are 0 for
every x€u. An information set u of this kind will be called*
inessentially reached by q
If an information set u of player i is inessentially reach-* *
ed by q , then the conditional choice probabilities ~(c,u,q )
will be exclusively determined by those pure strategies of*
player i which are inessential for q . Therefore the*
~i (c,u,q ) may be very unreasonable as a local strategy
at u.
* *
The crucial difference between band q is as folIows:
*
Whereas every local strategy in b is reasonalbe in the
sense that the essential choices are local best replies,
k
q may lead to unreasonable conditional choice probabili-
ties at those information sets which are inessentially*
reached by q .
*
As an example let r be the game in figure 3 and let q be
such that only the pure strategies in the equilibrium point*
(Rr,L2,R3) are essential for q . The information set of
player 1, where he chooses between land r is inessentially
reached. Therefore the conditional choice probabilities
for land r are not determined by Rr but exclusively by
the minimumprobabilities for LI and Lr which may be such
that 1 is selected with a high conditional choice probabi-
lity.
In an extensive game,where every player has at most one in-
formation set, it cannot happen that the information set*
of a player i is not reached by q /-i for one of his pure
strategies nie His strategy does not influence the reali-
zation probabilities of the vertices in his information set.
The agent normal form corresponds to an extensive form
where every player has at most one information set. There-
fore no difficulties arise in the agent normal form.
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